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DUST, DETERMINISM, AND FRANKFURT:
A REPLY TO GOETZ
Eleonore Stump

In a preceding issue of Faith and Philosophy Stewart Goetz criticized a paper of
mine in which 1 try to show that libertarians need not be committed to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) and that Frankfurt-style counterexamples to
PAP are no threat to libertarianism. In my view, the main problem with Goetz's
arguments is that Goetz does not properly understand my position. In this
paper, I respond to Goetz by summarizing my position in as plain a way as possible. Goetz's charge against my position has two parts, first, that it isn't libertarian and, second, that it provides no good reason for libertarians to abandon PAP.
This paper briefly presents my answers to these two parts of Goetz's charge.

Introduction
In a preceding issue of Faith and Philosophy! Stewart Goetz criticized a
paper of mine 2 in which Ttry to show that libertarians need not be committed to the principle of alternative possibilities (PAP) and that Frankfurtstyle cow1terexamples to PAP are no threat to libertarianism. Tn my view,
the main problem with Goetz's arguments is that Goetz does not properly
understand my position. Rather than pointing out the ways in which my
position is misconstrued, it seems to me more helpful to try to summarize
it in as plain a way as possible. Goetz's charge against my position has two
parts, first, that it isn't libertarian and, second, that it provides no good reason for libertarians to abandon PAP. I will divide my summary into two
parts to correspond to these two parts of Goetz's charge.
The heart of my position can be thought of this way. "Dust thou art and
LIDtO dust shalt thou return", says Genesis, in the old King James English.
Ecclesiastes says, "The dust shall return to the earth as it was, and the spirit
shall return to God who gave it". These two passages, as well as others,
have convinced Christians in past ages that the belief that a human person
is made out of matter is somehow compatible with the claim that human
beings have souls which can exist separated from bodies.' The view commonly described (rightly or wrongly) as Cartesian dualism" takes a different
view of human persons. On that view, a human person is a soul; and the
essentially human acts of thinking and willing take place only in a soul, not
in a body. For both theological and philosophical reasons, including the current philosophical disrepute of Cartesian dualism, 1 think it is worth considering what difference it makes to our understanding of moral responsibility
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if we take seriously the notion that a human person is made of matter.
In my view, this notion is compatible with a rejection of causal determinism, so that human acts of will are indeterministic. On the other hand,
however, as I will explain below, taking seriously the material constitution
of human persons makes it easier to construct Frankfurt stories in which an
agent acts with moral responsibility, and also indeterministically, and yet
is unable to act otherwise than she does. An agent's willing indeterministically is therefore not equivalent to her being able to do otherwise.
Consequently, although focusing on the material nature of human beings
strengthens the case against PAP, rejecting PAP is compatible with supposing that there are indeterministic human acts. The Frankfurt stories are sufficient to show PAP false, but they aren't nearly sufficient to show that
morally responsible acts can be causally determined.
To answer each part of Goetz's charge, in what follows I try to spell out
briefly what I take to be the implications of the view that human beings are
made of matter for libertarianism and for the principle of alternative possibilities.

Libertarianism
In other papers (one of which is the focus of Goetz's attack), I have
argued for what I take to be the view of moral responsibility held by
Thomas Aquinas.' According to Aquinas, human beings are morally
responsible for at least some of their actions, and causal determinism is
false. In particular, no acts of will for which a person is morally responsible
are causally determined by anything outside the willer.' At least for normal, sane persons, most acts of intellect are not causally determined either?
Nonetheless, as I interpret him/ Aquinas also rejects the principle of alternative possibilities. That is, Aquinas thinks an agent can be morally responsible for an act even if he couldn't have done otherwise. As I have argued
elsewhere/ this is not because Aquinas thinks that human beings never
have alternative possibilities when they are morally responsible for what
they do. On the contrary, most or virtually all of the time, a morally responsible human being does have alternative possibilities for what she does, on
Aquinas's view. But for Aquinas, the presence of alternative possibilities is
an accidental characteristic of moral responsibility; it isn't essential to it. So,
in certain sorts of cases, it is possible for a human being to act with moral
responsibility when only one course of action is available to her.
What is essential to moral responsibility on Aquinas's view is that a person be the ultimate source of what she does, that her intellect and will be
the ultimate causes of her acts.lO By 'ultimate cause' here, I mean that there
is nothing which is prior to that person's acts of intellect and will and
which causally determines her intellect and will to be in the states in which
they are. If we can trace a causal chain of any sort backward from an
agent's act, then the causal chain must originate only in acts of her will and
intellect. That is, for any act which the agent does, if there is any causal
chain at all of which that act is the effect, then the causal chain must have a
first or ultimate cause, and that ultimate cause cannot be anything other
than an act of the agent's own will or intellect. ll
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If we think of libertarianism, in the common way, as the position which
supposes that human beings are sometimes morally responsible for their
acts but that moral responsibility is incompatible with causal determinism,
then Aquinas's account of moral responsibility is a species of libertarianism. Furthermore, within the group of philosophical positions which hold
that human beings are sometimes morally responsible, the two main kinds
are compatibilism and libertarianism. Aquinas thinks people are morally
responsible, and he expressly rejects compatibilism. So it's natural to count
him among the libertarians.
On the other hand, if someone objects strongly to this terminology, it's
perfectly possible to find another generic name. We can pick the Greek,
rather than the Latin, analogue to 'freedom', and we can designate a genus
of philosophical positions 'eleutherianism'. Eleutherianism can then be
divided into two species. One species holds that (i) human beings are
sometimes morally responsible for their acts, that (ii) moral responsibility
is incompatible with causal determinism, and that (iii) moral responsibility
requires alternative possibilities. The other species, represented by
Aquinas's position, holds (i) and (ii) but not (iii). We can then reserve 'libertarianism' for the first species.
But it seems to me silly to squabble over names in this way and to proliferate technical terminology. Both species are committed to (i) and (ii),
and they differ only in (iii). Given that (i) and (ii) are sufficient to distinguish a position from both determinism and compatibilism, it seems to me
better to say that there are two species of libertarianism, one of which
accepts and the other of which rejects PAP. 12
There is one other point about libertarinism which is important to make
clear in this context.
Aquinas knew a view virtually identical to what is now called
'Cartesian dualism'; he associated it with Platonism, and he repudiated it
strenuously, in large part because he thought it isn't compatible with the
claim that a human being is made of matter. Because he had little understanding of the way the brain works, some of what Aquinas thought about
the relation between brain and mind is primitive or just false. Even now,
we don't understand very much about the brain, but what we know just
confirms the conclusion that Platonic or Cartesian dualism is wrong; there
is a much stronger connection between mind and brain than Cartesian
dualism supposes. For this reason, and those raised in the introduction to
this paper, I think it is worth considering non-Cartesian accounts of the
relation between mind and brain and asking what species of libertarianism
is compatible with them.
On most contemporary philosophical and biological theories of the
mind and brain, there is at least a correlation between mental states and
neural states. By saying that mental states are correlated with neural states,
I mean to claim that there is a strong connection between a mental act or
state and a neural state, but to leave general and vague the precise nature
of that connection in order to accommodate a variety of different contemporary theories. For example, those who think that the mental is identical
to the physical can suppose that mental acts or states and sequences of
neural firings are correlated because the mental acts or states are the neural
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sequences or states. On the other hand, even non-Cartesian dualists willing to accept a correlation between mental and neural states can be accommodated here. It is open to them to interpret the correlation as states of
soul and body which are somehow strongly and invariably connected.
They might suppose, for example, that what happens in the soul is always
mirrored at the same time by what happens in the body and vice versa, so
that affecting the brain with drugs or other medical intervention results in
a simultaneous alteration in the soul, and changes in the soul are matched
at the same time by a change in the brain.
Causal determinism and reductionism have so strong a hold on many
contemporary philosophers that connecting the mind to the brain in this
way will seem to them to entail that mental states are causally determined
by, and perhaps even reducible to, the physical states of the brain, which
are in tum causally determined by things outside the agent. Both those who
accept libertarianism and those who reject it are likely to suppose libertarians are committed to the position that the human will has a capacity not
shared by anything else in the world, including brain states, namely, the
capacity to initiate causal chains and to escape the great nexus of causation
that inexorably binds everything else in the world. To philosophers under
the spell of this view, it will seem impossible to accept a correlation between
mental and neural states of the sort I have just outlined and also to accept
libertarianism. To hold that a mental act is strongly correlated with a causal
chain of neural firings in the brain will seem to such philosophers to give up
the heart of libertarianism. That's because, on this sort of view, neural states
- unlike libertarian acts of will - are part of a causal chain that extends
outside the agent and doesn't stop until its origin in the big bang.
But reductionism, and also causal determinism, have come under
increasing attack in recent years, especially in philosophy of biology, for
reasons that have nothing to do with moral responsibility or human
agentsY I concur with those arguments. There is no space in this short
paper to spell them out;!4 but if they are sound, and I think they are, then
we should reject both reductionism and causal determinism, not only for
human agents but also for mice, rocks, and molecules. So, I think it is possible to hold that mental states and neural states are strongly correlated and
also to maintain that there are states of intellect and will which are not
caused by anything else. Therefore, the understanding of mental acts and
states as strongly correlated with neural sequences and neural states is
compatible with one of the main tenets of libertarianism, namely, that acts
of will for which a person is morally responsible are indeterministic.
So 1 think we can accept the view that a human person is made out of
matter and be libertarians as well.

PAP and Frankfurt stories
Does the claim that human beings sometimes act with moral responsibility and that morally responsible acts are indeterministic commit us to
accepting PAP? If human beings are made out of matter, then, in my view,
the answer is 'no'. Perhaps the will of a Cartesian spirit can't be controlled
by anything besides the person who is that spirit, but the will of a material-

DUST, DETERMINISM, FRANKFURT: A REPLY TO GOETZ

417

ly constituted human being can. If causal determinism is false, even a
material human person can initiate causal chains; he can control himself.
But anything made out of matter, including the intellect and will of human
beings, can also be externally controlled.
Ordinary Frankfurt-style counterexamples to PAP are built around preemption. In such Frankfurt stories, there is a controller who has a mechanism that is responsive to a state in the victim which is antecedent to the act
the controller wants to control. For example, in one of the most discussed
Frankfurt stories, a neurosurgeon has a neuroscope which detects Jones's
inclination to vote a certain way. If the neurosurgeon were to detect Jones's
inclination to vote in a way the neurosurgeon doesn't want him to vote, the
neurosurgeon would preempt Jones's own decision and cause Jones to
decide to vote in the way the neurosurgeon desires. But if there were no
reliable preceding sign, such as an inclination, it seems that the neurosurgeon couldn't preempt Jones's own decision. By the time the neurosurgeon
knew whether he should intervene or not, Jones would already have made
a decision. So w1less there is some reliable sign of how the victim is going to
decide, the neurosurgeon can't preempt the victim's decision.
David Widerker has argued that Frankfurt stories built around preemption in this way are incompatible with supposing that morally responsible
decisions are indeterministic. I, That is because the sign that clues the neurosurgeon to intervene has to be causally connected with the victim's decision if the sign is to function for the neurosurgeon as a reliable indicator of
the decision. But if the victim's decision is indeterministic, then it isn't
causally determined by anything which precedes it, and there is no reliable
sign of the sort needed by Frankfurt stories dependent on preemption.
I sympathize with Widerker's objection. But Frankfurt stories need not
be built around preemption. Instead, they can make use of the strong correlation bctween mental and ncural states to allow the counterfactual intervener to interrupt, rather than preempt, neural sequences correlated with
acts of will.
To understand how Frankfurt stories of the interruption sort work, it's
necessary to recognize that the correlation between a mental act or state and
the firings of neurons must be a one-many relation. When I suddenly recognize my daughter's face across a crowded room, that one mental act of
recognition, which to me feels sudden or even instantaneous, is correlated
with many neural firings as information from the retina is sent through the
optic nerve, relayed through the lateral geniculate nucleus of the thalamus,
processed in various parts of the occipital cortex, which take account of figure, motion, orientation in space, and color, and then processed further in
cortical association areas. Only when the whole sequence of neural firings is
completed, do I have the mental act of recognizing my daughter. Whatever
neural firings are correlated with an act of will or intellect, I take it that in
this case, as in all others, the correlation between the mental act and the firing of the relevant neurons is a one-many relation. 16 Unless Cartesian dualism is correct, then, there is no mental act in an agent unless and until the
correlated sequence of neural firings in that agent's brain is completed. 17
It's important to be clear about this point. If the firing of the whole neural
sequence correlated with a mental act is not completed, the result isn't some
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truncated or incomplete mental act. It's no mental act at all. If the neural
sequence correlated with my recognizing my daughter's face across a
crowded room is interrupted at the level of the thalamus, say, then I will
have no mental act having to do with seeing her. I won't, for example, think
to myself, "For a moment there, I thought I saw my daughter, but now I'm
not sure./I I won't have a sensation of almost but not quite seeing her. I
won't have a premonition that I was about to see her, and then I mysteriously just don't see her. I will simply have no mental act regarding recognition of her whatsoever. To suppose that there could be some sort of mental
act, truncated, incomplete, or otherwise defective, when there is no completed neural sequence correlated with that mental act, is to accept some
version of Cartesian dualism. It is to suppose that there can be a mental act
without there being a completed neural sequence correlated with that mental act. So if the neural sequence correlated with a mental act is interrupted,
then that mental act doesn't occur. If there is any mental act at all in those
circumstances, it will occur only because there is some other completed
sequence of neural firings correlated with that mental act. So although a
mental act such as a decision may feel, subjectively, as if it is simple and
instantaneous, the neural sequence with which it is correlated is neither.
This is enough to allow the neurosurgeon to control his victim without
relying on the sorts of signs in the Frankfurt stories built around preemption.
Given that human beings are made of matter, we can build a Frankfurt-style
counterxample to PAP as an interruption story. In a Frankfurt story of the
interruption sort, the neurosurgeon's instrument controls the victim in virtue
of its ability to interrupt the neural sequence correlated with an act of will
rather than by its ability to preempt that act itself, and yet it can also be true
that in the actual sequence of events there is nothing which causally determines the victim's act of will. The features Widerker objects to in the preemption stories are thus missing in the interruption stories.
To see why this is so, it might help to consider what a Frankfurt interruption story looks like if we postulate the simplest sort of correlation between
the mental and the neural. Suppose, per improbabile, that the mental and the
neural are identical. Then any mental act will just be the firing of a whole
neural sequence. With this presupposition, let it be the case that the neurosurgeon's victim, Jones, forms an act of will W. On our presupposition,
there will then also be in Jones's brain a completed neural sequence N. And
suppose further that W is an indeterministic act of will. If Wand N are identical, then this supposition entails that neural sequence N just fires, without
being caused to fire by anything antecedent to it. IS Consequently, there can
be no reliable prior sign of W. Nothing causally determines N or W, and so
there is nothing prior to N or W which is a reliable sign of Nor W.
Nonetheless, it is clear that even in such a world, a counterfactual intervener could operate. That's because neural sequence N - even if it just
begins to fire, without being caused to fire by anything prior - is composite
and divisible. And that's enough to give the intervener scope to operate.
The intervener can then use as his cue the beginning of that neural
sequence. By intervening somewhere in the middle of the neural sequence,
the intervener brings it about that the neural sequence isn't completed.
Since the relation between a mental act or state and neural firings is a one-
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many relation, if the intervener intervenes to keep the neural sequence from
being completed, he prevents the victim from forming the act of will W. But
he does so without taking as his cue some prior cause of W. Instead, he
operates on something which is identical to the mental act.
I don't suppose that mental acts are really identical to the firing of neural sequences. Whatever the right relation between the mental and the neural is, I think it is a lot weaker than identity. 1 constructed the simple
Frankfurt interruption story above with the supposition that the mental
and the physical are identical for the sake of illustrating the difference
between Frankfurt preemption stories and Frankfurt interruption stories,
but a Frankfurt interruption story doesn't require that the relation between
the mental and the neural be nearly so strong. It requires only that a mental
act be strongly correlated with a neural sequence, in the way described
above, and that the relation between them be a one-many relation. That is
enough to allow the neurosurgeon to operate without relying on any prior
state or event which causes the neural sequence or the act of will.
Furthermore, if a neurosurgeon did intervene by interrupting a neural
sequence in this way, then the victim would form no mental act; there
would be nothing the victim does. The victim wouldn't have the mental act
of engaging in the beginning of a decision. He wouldn't report his condition by saying, "I was just about to make a decision but then somehow I
didn't", anymore than in the face recognition example in which the
sequence of neural firings beginning in my retina was terminated in the
thalamus I would report my condition by saying, "r was about to see my
daughter but then 1 didn't" . Instead, the victim won't have any mental act
or state to report.
Or, to put the point another way, if the victim in a Frankfurt interruption story did have a mental act or state to report, there would be a completed neural sequence correlating with that mental act or state - and
then the neurosurgeon could interrupt that neural sequence.
In such a Frankfurt interruption story, then, the neurosurgeon can interrupt the neural sequence correlated with a certain act of will, if he doesn't
want that act of will on the victim's part, and he can use his coercive neurological mechanism to fire instead the neural sequence correlated with the
act of will he wants the victim to form. The victim can thus be controlled
by the intervener without there being anything which causally determines
the victim's act of will in the actual sequence of events in which the neurosurgeon does not intervene. Since the intervener controls the victim, however, it will also be true that the victim couldn't form any act of will other
than that act which the intervener wants the victim to have. Consequently,
in a Frankfurt interruption story, it will be true that the victim's act of will,
for which he is morally responsible, is indeterministic and yet that the victim cannot will otherwise than he does. 19
This does seem to me a good reason for libertarians to give up on PAP.

Conclusion
For the reasons given in the two main sections of this paper, then, Goetz is
mistaken. Aquinas's account is appropriately designated 'libertarian', and
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there are two species of libertarianism, not just one. Consequently, libertarians need not be committed to PAP; one can reject PAP and still hold a
species of libertarianism. Furthermore, Frankfurt interruption stories, which
are compatible with libertarianism, provide a good reason for rejecting PAP.
So, of the two species of libertarianism, the better one is Aquinas's, which
doesn't require alternative possibilities for moral responsibility.CI!
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10. There is a complication which I am leaving to one side here. According
to Aquinas, God is the creator of every created thing and any created cause is
always dependent on the operation of divine causality. Tn my view, however,
this position of Aquinas's and his account of grace and free will are both compatible with what I say here, if his views are properly understood; but there is
no space in this paper to argue for this claim. For the sake of simplicity in this
paper, therefore, the reader should take ultimate or first causes as restricted to
created causes.
11. Robert Kane has argued that what matters to philosophers who value
indeterminism as a requirement for moral responsibility is just our having ultimate responsibility for what we do. I think that his point is right and that
Aquinas would have agreed with him. See Robert Kane, The Significance of Free
Will, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), p.192; see also my discussion of
this issue in Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility: the Flicker of
Freedom",op.cit.
12. Goetz may want to say that (i) and (ii) entail (iii), so that the Thomistic
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assumed to be true without begging the question. I have argued that (ii) does
not entail (iii) in Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility: the Flicker
of Freedom", op.cit.
13. For a helpful discussion of the general problem of reductionism relevant to the issues considered here, see Alan Garfinkel, "Reductionism", in The
Philosophy ol Science, ed. Richard Boyd, Philip Gasper, and J.D.Trout,
(Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1993), pp.443-459. Garfinkel argues against
reductionism by trying to show that reductive microexplanations are often not
sufficient to explain the macrophenomena they are intended to explain and
reduce. He says, "A macros tate, a higher level state of the organization of a
thing, or a state of the social relations between one thing and another can have
a particular realization which, in some sense, "is" that state in this case. But the
explanation of the higher order state will not proceed via the microexplanation
of the microstate which it happens to "be". Instead, the explanation will seek
its own leveL" (p.449). Aquinas would agree, and Aquinas's account of the
relation of matter and form in material objects helps explain Garfinkel's point.
A biological system has a form as well as material components, so that the system is not identical to the components alone; and some of the properties of the
system are a consequence of the form of the system as a whole. Garfinkel himself recognizes the aptness of the historical distinction between matter and
form for his argument against reductionism. He says, "the independence of
levels of explanation ... can be found in Aristotle's remark that in explanation it
is the form and not the matter that counts." (p. 449). See also Philip Kitcher,
"1953 and All That: A Tale of Two Sciences", in The Philosopizy olScience, op.cit.,
pp.553-570. Particularly helpful and interesting on this subject is a recent book
by John Dupre, Tize Disorder of Things. Metaphysical Foundations of the Disunity of
Science, (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993). Dupre argues that
causal determinism falls with the fall of reductionism.
14. But I do discuss them in the paper Goetz criticizes, "Libertarian
Freedom and the Principle of Alternative Possibilities", pp. 81-84.
15. David Widerker, "Libertarian Freedom and the Avoidability of
Decisions", Faith and Philosophy, 12 (1995) 113-118, and "Libertarianism and
Frankfurt's Attack on the Principle of Alternative Possibilities", The
Philosophical Review 104 (1995) 247-261.
16. What kind of one-many relation one takes this to be depends on what
theory of the relationship of mind to brain one adopts. For those who think
U
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that mental states are identical to neural states, for example, the correlation
between mind and brain has the implication that a mental act is temporally
extended throughout the microseconds it takes for all the neurons in the correlated sequence to fire. (Something needs to be said to explain why, even on this
view, there is no mental act without a completed neural sequence. Perhaps the
proponents of this view might want to say that a mental act correlated with a
completed neural sequence doesn't exist unless and until all its components
exist and that its components are subjectively indiscernible.) On other theories
of the relation of mind to brain, it could be the case for other reasons that the
mental act comes into existence simultaneously with the firing of the last neuron in the sequence.
17. If a neural sequence and a mental act or state are correlated in the way
at issue here, then the neural sequence exists if and only if the correlated mental act or state exists. To ward off the sort of confusion which sometimes arises
in this connection in philosophy of mind, it is probably helpful to add that
nothing in my presuppositions makes it necessary that mental acts and states
be correlated with neural sequences in this way - there might be creatures for
whom the mental is correlated with states of silicon instead, for example - or
that there be one and only one neural sequence which is correlated in a lawlike way, for all human beings or even within the life of just one human person, with one particular mental act or state. All that is required for the correlation at issue here is that a particular embodied human being in this world be
such that he has some mental state or engages in some mental act if and only if
the neural sequence correlated with that act or state in him is completed. And,
as I have explained, this is a position which even some dualists can accept. If a
mental act or state in the soul is simultaneously mirrored by a neural state in
the brain and vice versa, then if that neural state exists, it is true that the correlated mental act or state does also, and if the neural state does not exist, it's true
that the correlated mental act or state doesn't exist either.
18. If there are indeterministic brain states, they are bound to be more complicated than this; but the biology doesn't need to be perfectly right for the
philosophical point. One attempt to provide a biologically acceptable account
of indeterministic neural events can be found in Kane op. cit. While Kane's
account is scientifically sophisticated, r don't think it is correct because it is
reductionistic; as far as I can see, Kane limits any real indeterminism to the
microphysical realm.
19. Some philosophers have supposed that even in the most tightly constructed Frankfurt stories there is still a "Hicker of freedom". For an excellent
discussion of the Hicker of freedom strategy, see John Martin Fischer, The
Metaphysics of Free Will, (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), chapter 7. See also my
"Alternative Possibilities and Moral Responsibility: the Flicker of Freedom",
op.cit.
20. I'm grateful to John Dupre, John Martin Fischer, and Norman
Kretzmann for comments on an earlier version of this paper.

